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Abstract: Space applications are complex systems that require intricate trade analyses for optimum implementations.  We focus on a subset of the trade process, using classical reliability theory and SEU data, to illustrate appropriate TMR scheme selection.  
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 This study investigates mitigation performance 
and risk analysis for a variety of mitigation design 
strategies.  The intention is to provide a means for 
optimum mitigation integration for critical applications. 
Risk is measured by analyzing reliability across time 
using classical reliability models and measured single 
event upset (SEU) data.  
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Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) 
 TMR schemes [3-5] are defined by which portion of the circuit is 
triplicated and where the voters are placed. 
•  The strongest TMR implementation will triplicate all data-paths and apply 
separate voters to each data-path. 
•  However, this can be costly: area, power, and complexity. 
•  A trade is performed to determine the TMR scheme that requires the 
least amount of effort and circuitry and while meeting project 
requirements. 
•  Scope of mitigation for this study is: 
     Block TMR(BTMR), Local TMR (LTMR), and Distributed TMR (DTMR). 
 In this study, reliability is also analyzed across particle fluence by 
transforming classical reliability models [1] from the time domain into the 
fluence domain.  As a benefit, analyzing mitigation in the fluence domain 
enhances the evaluation process by providing the ability to make direct 
comparisons to accelerated radiation test data (SEU data). Design 
implementation is targeted to a Sequential random access memory (SRAM)-
based field programmable gate array (FPGA) (Xilinx Kintex-7) [2].  SEU test 
data was obtained by performing heavy-ion testing at Texas A&M Cyclotron 
Facility. 
SEU Errors and Fault Correction SEU Test Methodology 
 The primary design under investigation (DUI) was the Counter Array [2] as illustrated in Figure 7. Variations of the DUI were created 
and implemented in the Xilinx Kintex-7 FPAG device (XC7K325T-1FBG900). Heavy-ion testing was performed at Texas A&M University 
Cyclotron Facility (TAMU).    
Partitioning: SRAM-based FPGAs contain a significant number of shared resources that can become single points of failure [7]. 
Consequently, designs were partitioned such that no resources were shared across TMR domains. A partitioned design is illustrated in Figure 
8.  The Xilinx floor-planner tool was used for partitioning. 
Mitigation: Evaluating mitigation strength was the primary goal of this investigation. The following is a list of DUI (counter array) variations 
that were manually developed: (1) no-mitigation (pure counters), (2) BTMR with partitioning, (3) DTMR with partitioning, and (4) DTMR without 
partitioning. One additional DUI was created by using the Synopsys’ “Synplify Premier” synthesis tool [9]. Referring to Figure 7, DTMR 
(without voter feedback) was applied to the counter-array and LTMR was applied to its snap-shop array.  We refer to this scheme as partial 
TMR (PTMR).  
Scrubbing: During testing, an external configuration memory scrubber [3] was applied to the DUT’s configuration. The configuration scrubber 
was verified for full operation during testing by performing a read-back of the DUT’s configuration memory.  Read-back should indicate 
approximately zero errors after each heavy-ion test. 
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 Because configuration SEUs are the dominant 
component faults in unhardened SRAM-based FPGAs [3]; and 
their affects to system operation are prolific, a strong TMR 
scheme (that can mask a variety of configuration SEUs) is 
required (BTMR or DTMR) [3-5].  Consequently, do not use 
LTMR with SRAM-based FPGAs as illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4: Mitigation window (MW) example. 
SRAM-Based FPGA TMR Strategies: Strengths and Weaknesses 
 Equation (1) describes the four categories of SEUs in FPGAs [3]: 
Configuration, functional logic, global routes, and hidden logic. Figure 4 illustrates 
how a design can be modularized into mitigation windows (MWs). The effects of 
SEUs on MWs can be classified as follows:  
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λ:error rate 
 BTMR is a common approach to mitigation for two 
primary reasons: 
•  It requires the least number of voters (area savings) and 
•  It can be applied to black-box logic (e.g., intellectual 
property (IP) cores). 
  
 
SRAM-Based FPGAs and LTMR: 
SRAM-Based FPGAs and BTMR: 
Table 1: Classical reliability models over time. 
Figure 7: Block diagram of design under investigation – Counter Array 
Figure 8: Physical layout of a partitioned TMR 
design (the same partitions were used for BTMR, 
DTMR, and PTMR). 
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BTMR: Voting is only performed at the 
outputs of complex blocks.  
•  Does not correct errors only masks 
them. 
•  If blocks are not regularly flushed 
(e.g. reset), errors might accumulate 
– may not be an effective technique. 
 
Figure 1: BTMR [3].  Triplicate complex 
function and place voter at outputs.  
•  Complex function is treated as a black-box.   
•  Global route SEUs, accumulated faults (no 
correction), and shared resource SEUs (single 
points of failure) can break the mitigation 
scheme. 
Figure 2: LTMR [3].  Only DFFs are 
triplicated.  Data-paths stay singular.  
•  LTMR masks upsets from DFFs and 
corrects DFF upsets i f voter 
feedback is used.  
•  SEUs in the data path, global route 
SEUs, and shared resource SEUs 
(single points of failure) can break 
the mitigation scheme. 
 
Figure 3: DTMR [3]. The entire design is triplicated. Voters are brought inside of the design and are placed 
after the DFFs.   
•  Most SEUs are masked.   
•  Errors can be corrected if voter feedback to DFFs are used. 
•   Global route SEUs, and shared resource SEUs (single points of failure) can break the mitigation scheme. 
Deliverable to NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program to be published on nepp.nasa.gov. 
•  MW boundaries: Start at a voter-output or a device input; 
End at a DFF-voter pair or a device output 
•  Internal MW elements can be CL or DFFs (i.e., if a DFF does 
not have a voter, then it is not a MW boundary) 
TMR Mitigation Window Definition 
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•  The SEU in associated with an unused resource or disabled logic and consequently does not affect system 
operation. 
•  The SEU fault only affects one of the TMR triplet copies within the same mitigation window (MW). If only one 
triplet copy has a fault, then the MW will either (a) mask the fault or (b) mask and correct the fault.  
•  The SEU fault affects multiple triplet copies within the same MW. If more than one of the triplet copies are 
affected by an SEU, then the MW will malfunction and the fault will not be masked from the system.  This is a 
common error signature of global route SEUs or configuration SEUs that control shared resources. 
 BTMR is a fairly strong mitigation strategy for flushable designs; i.e., 
feed-forward or highly-resettable circuits (as illustrated in Figure 6).  It is also 
considered a strong application when requirements dictate short time intervals of 
correct operation.  
 Table 1 lists the classical reliability and Mean time to failure (MTTF) 
models [1] for an unmitigated design versus the corresponding BTMR 
implementation.  If a mission’s requirements dictate that BTMR shall reliably 
operate for a length of time near the time of failure for one unmitigated block, 
then BTMR becomes a weak mitigation scheme.  This is because over time, the 
reliability of the BTMR scheme drops off faster than the unmitigated. Table 1 
shows: MTTFblock  > MTTFBTMR. 
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Figure 6: Flushable BTMR system. 
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Figure 9: Integral LET spectra for GCR during solar 
maximum and solar minimum [8]. 
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SEU Test Results 
Mitigation Strength 
 Given the counter-array DUI and based on σSEU data from Figure 10, 
DTMR with partitioning is the strongest mitigation strategy.  This result is as 
expected.  At the lower LETs, DTMR σSEU data has greater than one decade of 
improvement versus BTMR and over two decades versus no-mitigation.   
 As LET increases, the mitigation strategies start to converge in 
performance.  This is because of the dominance of global route SEUs at higher 
LETs.  Global route SEUs are a common factor for failure in all three strategies. 
 It was interesting to observe that there was not a significant difference 
between DTMR with partitioning and DTMR without partitioning. Potential 
explanations for the insignificant difference in σSEU data are the following: there 
may be hidden shared resources beyond the control of the floor-planner 
(partitioning tool), global routes may have a strong significance, and the DUI’s 
isolated independent modules may play a role.  As future work, this will be further 
investigated using a variety of DUIs and fault injection. 
 PTMR proved to be weaker than the system with no mitigation as LET 
increased.  This is because LTMR was applied to the snap-shot register.  As 
previously mentioned, LTMR should not be used with SRAM-based FPGAs.   
BTMR and Reliability Models 
 In this investigation (counter-array DUI), BTMR performed better than 
expected; i.e., it’s MFTF was higher (in all tested LETs) than the unmitigated 
design.  This can be attributed to the fact that the DUI was made of 200 small 
independent modules (counters) and one large flushable structure (snap-shot 
array).  Results closer to the reliability model predictions are expected to occur 
with DUIs that have one large MW with strong co-dependencies between 
modules. However, better results are expected with DUIs that are purely flushable. 
BTMR and Availability 
 Regarding Figure 13, while the BTMR σSEU data can be used to 
characterize mitigation failure, the one-out-of-three can be used to assess 
availability.  The premise is that when one copy fails, another is assumed to fail 
soon.  Subsequently, BTMR schemes require the system to halt or shut down 
upon one-out-of-three failure.  During this time, the system either flushes or the 
failed copied is serviced.  This affects availability and is of critical concern for 
satisfying mission requirements. Further discussion is in the paper. 
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 The conversion process from σSEU data to error-rates tends to lose 
valuable information regarding data trends across low LET.  Hence, an analysis in 
the fluence domain was performed by transforming classical reliability models from 
the time domain to the fluence domain.  The conversion is as follows: replace error-
rates (λ) with heavy-ion accelerated testing σSEU data (λèσSEU) and time with 
fluence (tèΦ). This transformation was performed to improve lower-LET analysis 
of mitigation strategies. 
 As expected, DTMR was the strongest mitigation scheme.  However, there 
is interesting data that show DTMR without partitioning performed almost as 
well as DTMR with partitioning.  This will be further investigated with altering DUI 
MW size, creating more co-dependent internal-MW modules, and fault injection. 
 σSEU data and reliability models illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of 
BTMR.  Data show that it is important to take into account the mission’s required 
operational time and availability prior to selecting BTMR as the system’s mitigation 
strategy. 
 An important result was observed with PTMR.  The data showed that a 
poor choice of mitigation application can cause the system to be more 
susceptible than a system with no mitigation. 
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See paper. 
Figure 13: BTMR availability: BTMR failure; versus failure with 
no mitigation; versus any one failure out of the BTMR copies. 
Figure 10: Comparison of MFTF for all mitigation strategies. 
Figure 12: Reliability across particle fluence: 
Zoomed-in low fluence region of Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Reliability across particle fluence: 
BTMR versus System with No Mitigation. 
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC), Boston, Massachusetts, July 13-17, 2015. 
SEU cross-section (σSEU)  DFF: Flip flop CL: combinatorial logic Single event functional interrupt: SEFI 
DFF: Flip flop  
CL: combinatorial logic 
CL CL CL 
DFF 
DFF 
DFF 
CL CL CL 
R
O
U
T
I
N
G
 
M
A
T
R
I
X
I1 I2 I3 I4 
LUT 
Look Up Table: LUT 
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
I1 I2 I3 I4 
LUT 
I1 I2 I3 I4 
LUT 
I1 I2 I3 I4 
LUT 
Voter 
Figure 5: Block diagram of LTMR in an SRAM-based FPGA.  With 
LTMR, there exists too many other configuration bits + logic (beyond 
the protected DFFs) that can be corrupted by an SEU.  Applied 
mitigation needs to be stronger for SRAM-based FPGA devices. 
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 The traditional approach to SEU data analysis and characterization is to convert σSEU data to error-rates.  However, during the 
conversion process (from the fluence (Φ) domain to the time (t) domain), important information in the lower LET region is lost.  Referring to 
Figure 9, there is a significant difference of particle flux when comparing lower LET particles to higher.  Subsequently, in order to perform a 
comparison of mitigation efficiency, it is important to investigate behavior at lower LET without loss of information.  For this reason, we replace 
error-rates (λ) with σSEU data (λèσSEU) and time with fluence (tèΦ ) to convert classical reliability models from the t-domain to the Φ-domain. 
σSEU data from Figure 10 can be used as the variables in the Table 1 equations to obtain the reliability graphs shown in Figure 11 and Figure 
12.  
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